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CASES NOTED
this purpose need not be choked by inflexible restrictions implied by the
sixth amendment. As long as the jury is large enough to promote group
deliberation and to provide a fair possibility for obtaining a representa-
tive cross section of the community, it will be able to perform its role;
i.e., to interpose between the accused and his accuser. This decision leaves
Congress and the states free to objectively evaluate and implement the
most advantageous and practical number of jurors necessary to adequately
perform the functions of a jury within our present judicial environment.
It is evident to this writer that there are very good arguments in
favor of a smaller jury.27 The advantages are numerous and include the
possibilities of reducing delays and the steadily increasing costs of litiga-
tion. As long as due consideration is given to preserve the effectiveness
of the jury, it is time that all lawmaking bodies untie themselves from
the archaic past. Now that the number twelve is no longer sacred, it may
be advisable for the various states to examine the structure of their jury
systems and adapt the size of the jury to the requirements of each par-
ticular type of litigation.2"
LAWRENCE H. GOLDBERG
FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND RES JUDICATA:
LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS OF FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS CLOSING
THE DOOR TO THE FEDERAL COURTS
The plaintiff, Paul, initially litigated and lost in the Florida state
courts an action for a declaratory decree that the erection of a Latin
Cross each December on the defendant's courthouse, with the sanction
of the defendant's county government, was a violation of the establish-
ment and freedom of religion clauses of the first amendment as applied to
the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
and was also a violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution.' Subsequently, Feder
(1968). "Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an
inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the com-
pliant, biased, or eccentric judge." Id. at 156.
27. Wiehl, Six Man Jury, 4 GONZAGA L. REv. 3S (1968); Tamm, The Five-Man Civil
Jury, 51 GEo. L.J. 120 (1962). For evaluations of experiments with smaller juries which
resulted in prompt trials, lower costs, and verdicts no different than those returned by 12-man
juries, the reader should consult the following sources: Cronin, Six-Member Juries in District
Courts, 2 BOSTON B.J. 27 (1958) ; Six-Member Juries Tried in Massachusetts District Court,
42 J. Am. Jun. Soc'y 136 (1958).
28. Another area of jury reform under current consideration, although outside the scope
of this note, is the controversy regarding the merits of majority versus unanimous verdicts.
1. Paul v. Dade County, 202 So.2d 833 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967), cert. denied, 207 So.2d 690
(Fla. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1041 (1968).
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joined Paul in filing a similar suit in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida. This complaint was dismissed for
failure to allege a specific statutory grant of jurisdiction.' On appeal to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the court, al-
though finding specific statutory jurisdiction,' took judicial notice of the
previous state court litigation and held, affirmed: A federal district court
has no jurisdiction to hear federal constitutional cases already litigated
in state courts.4 Paul v. Dade County, 419 F.2d 10 (5th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1065 (1970).
This note will not discuss the first amendment establishment and
free exercise of religion issues raised in the state and federal court litiga-
tion.' Instead, attention will be focused on the two issues raised in the
Fifth Circuit's opinion: the jurisdiction of the federal courts vis-a-vis
the state courts; and the res judicata effect of prior state court decisions
on the right to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
I. JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of the federal district courts is derived from Acts
of Congress, as authorized by the United States Constitution, and is
clearly original in nature." That the federal district courts do not have
authority to merely review state court decisions, i.e., exercise appellate
2. This court is powerless to act in the absence of a specific statutory grant of juris-
diction. A careful inspection of the complaint in this case failed to disclose that the
jurisdiction of this Court has been validly invoked.
Thereupon, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED that this complaint be and the
same is hereby dismissed without prejudice.
Paul v. Dade County, Civ. No. 68-1229 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 9, 1968).
3. See note 48 infra.
4. A federal district court is without jurisdiction to hear federal constitutional claims
already litigated in state courts when, as here, there is already a final, appealable
judgment by a state court at the time the federal suit is instituted.
Paul v. Dade County, 419 F.2d 10, 13 (5th Cir. 1969).
On the court's authority to sua sponte question its jurisdiction at any time, see, e.g.,
Vorachek v. United States, 337 F.2d 797 (8th Cir. 1964); Lowry v. International Bhd. of
Boilermakers, 259 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1958).
5. In the state court, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had erected a Latin cross
on a public building, with public funds, and that this action constituted the establishment
of religion in violation of the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Con-
stitution as well as parts of the Florida Constitution. From an adverse final decree in the
circuit court, the plaintiff appealed to the third district court of appeal which held, affirmed:
[W]e hold that under the Schempp test [School Dist. of Abington Tp. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963)], this does not amount to the establishment of a religion in
violation of the First Amendment, and that it does notamount to a religious activity,
controlled, supported or influenced by the government ....
Paul v. Dade County, 202 So.2d 833, 835 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967). The ratio decidendi was that
the cross had acquired a secular connotation as a yule season decoration, as have other pre-
viously purely religious symbols such as the dove, star, fish, and three intertwined rings.
6. The Constitution does not create any inferior federal courts, but gives Congress the
power to do so. Thus these courts must have their genesis in acts of Congress, and
the extent of their jurisdiction depends, subject to constitutional limits, upon the
Congressional grant.
1 A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTIcE f[ 0.201 (2d ed. 1965) [footnotes omitted.]
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jurisdiction over state court decisions, was clearly established by the Su-
preme Court in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.7 While the Rooker case is
still the most definitive statement of the law in this area, there are some
interesting qualifications regarding its application in such areas as de-
privation of constitutional rights,8 habeas corpus,' public policy,' 0 and
deprivation of voting rights."
The effect of state court litigation of federal claims upon the right
to return to the federal courts was expressly decided by the Supreme
Court in England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners.12
We now explicitly hold that if a party freely and without reser-
vation submits his federal claims for decision by the state
courts, litigates them there, and has them decided there, then-
whether or not he seeks direct review of the state decisions in
this Court-he has elected to forgo his right to return to the
District Court."3
While the England case was basically an application of the abstention
doctrine, it involved the concepts of jurisdiction and res judicata. The
plaintiffs, chiropractors, brought an action in the federal district court
seeking an injunction exempting them from the educational requirements
7. 263 U.S. 413 (1923). In a much quoted opinion, Mr. Justice Van Devanter said:
If the constitutional questions stated in the bill actually arose in the cause, it was
the province and duty of the state courts to decide them; and their decision, whether
right or wrong, was an exercise of jurisdiction. If the decision was wrong, that did
not make the judgment void, but merely left it open to reversal or modification in
an appropriate and timely appellate proceeding. Unless and until so reversed or
modified, it would be an effective and conclusive adjudication. . . . Under the legis-
lation of Congress, no court of the United States other than this court could
entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify the judgment for errors of that char-
acter. . . . To do so would be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction. The jurisdiction
possessed by the District Courts is strictly original.
Id. at 415-16 (footnotes omitted). This passage was quoted with full approval and was in
fact the ratio decidendi of Brown v. Chastain, 416 F.2d 1012, 1013 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 951 (1970), a decision relied upon by the Fifth Circuit in the Paul case.
See also Dade County Classroom Teacher's Ass'n, Inc. v. Nathan, 413 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir.
1969); Jones v. Huise, 391 F.2d 198 (8th Cir. 1968); Warriner v. Fink, 307 F.2d 933 (5th
Cir. 1962).
8. Hanna v. Home Ins. Co., 281 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 838
(1961). In this case, the court followed Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923)
but propounded the following dicta: "Unless alleged errors constitute a deprivation of con-
stitutional rights, they may be reviewed only by the United States Supreme Court." Hanna v.
Home Ins. Co., 281 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1960) (emphasis added). See also O'Connor v.
O'Connor, 315 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1963).
9. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
10. Kloeb v. Armour & Co., 311 U.S. 199 (1940).
11. When a state exercises power wholly within the domain of state interest, it is
insulated from federal judicial review. But such insulation is not carried over when
state power is used as an instrument for circumventing a federally protected right.
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960); accord, South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. 301 (1966).
12. 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
13. Id. at 419, accord, Rankin v. Florida, 418 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 1969); Deane Hill
Country Club, Inc. v. City of Knoxville, 379 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1967).
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of the Louisiana Medical Practice Act on the ground that it violated the
fourteenth amendment. A statutory three-judge court invoked the doc-
trine of abstention to allow the state courts to act. The plaintiffs submit-
ted all questions including the constitutionality of the Act to the state
courts which ruled against them. They returned to the federal district
court which dismissed their case holding that they could not relitigate
in the lower federal courts issues tried in the state courts (their only
proper remedy being in the United States Supreme Court)." However,
the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the
district court for a decision on the merits of plaintiff's fourteenth amend-
ment claims. Mr. Justice Brennan raised a fundamental objection to
forcing a litigant, who has properly invoked the federal district court's
jurisdiction regarding federal constitutional claims, to be compelled to
accept instead a state court's determination of those claims. 5
[R]eview, even when available by appeal rather than only by
discretionary writ of certiorari, is an inadequate substitute for
the initial District Court determination-often by three judges,
28 U.S.C. § 2281-to which the litigant is entitled in the federal
courts. This is true as to issues of law; it is especially true as to
issues of fact. Limiting the litigant to review here would deny
him the benefit of a federal trial court's role in constructing a
record and making fact findings. How the facts are found will
often dictate the decision of federal claims.' 6
The England case, which merged the principles of jurisdiction and
abstention with that of res judicata, was apparently followed in Rankin v.
Florida.'7 In this case, a federal class action was brought under the Fed-
eral Declaratory Judgment Act challenging the constitutionality of a Flor-
ida statute. The action was dismissed in the federal district court and the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that since a similar ac-
tion had taken place in the state courts and had finally been ruled upon
and the parties and issues were identical in substance, if not in form, dis-
missal was correct under the England case and the doctrine of res
judicata.'8
14. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 194 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. La.
1961). See note 7 supra.
15. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
16. Id. at 416. This is not to say that there will not be times when the public interest
can be served without hurting private interests and the usual rule of comity must govern in
the exercise of equitable jurisdiction by the federal district court. Accord, Alabama Pub.
Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315
(1943). See also Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513, 525 (1958).
Furthermore, a party may clearly elect to forego his right to return to the federal dis.
trict court. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
17. 418 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 1969).
18. Id. at 486.
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II. RES JUDICATA
Thus, we are confronted with the second major issue involved in the
Paul case-the res judicata effect of state court decisions on the right to
utilize the federal courts.19
Perhaps, the best capsule statement on the doctrine of res judicata
(if one is possible at all) was expressed by Professor Moore:
Res judicata... is a salutary doctrine of repose that gives
conclusive finality to a final, valid judgment, and, if the judg-
ment is on the merits, precludes further litigation of the same
cause of action between the same parties or those in such legal
relationship to them that they are said to be in privity and bound
by the judgment.20
It is important that the judgment be on the merits, for only then will it
merge with the plaintiff's claim.2' Also, the existence of the same cause
of action is paramount; 22 unfortunately, defining the cause of action
has proved to be far more difficult.2" Furthermore, the parties must be
19. In this respect, we will be concerned with only two aspects of the broad concept
of res judicata; the privity of parties requirement and the public policy ameliorating the
doctrine.
20. lB J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE f 0.401 (2d ed. 1965) (footnotes omitted) [here-
inafter cited as MOORE]. Professor Moore goes on to emphasize the importance of the same
cause of action because, technically, if different causes of action are involved, res judicata
does not apply and only collateral estoppel can be used to prevent a subsequent litigation
of the same issues of fact. Furthermore, the parties are not bound by matters not previously
adjudged even if they could have been. Id. See also F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.18
(1965) [hereinafter cited as JAMES]; Notes, Collateral Estoppel: The Demise of Mutuality,
52 CORNELL L. Q. 724 (1967); Cleary, Res Judicata Reexamined, 57 YALE L.J. 339 (1948).
This distinction between res judicata and collateral estoppel is important because of the
following general rule which applies only to res judicata.
[A] judgment upon the merits in one suit is res judicata in another where the parties
and subject-matter are the same, not only as respects matters actually presented to
sustain or defeat the right asserted, but also as respects any other available matter
which might have been presented to that end.
Grubb v. Public Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 281 U.S. 470, 479 (1930) (emphasis added).
It is also important to note that rulings of law, divorced from specific facts, do not
become binding upon the parties under res judicata, but rather become legal precedents
under the broader doctrine of stare decisis, which would be the case even if they involved
entirely different parties. JAMES at § 11.22; RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 70 (1942) [here-
inafter cited as JUDGMENTS].
21. JAMES at § 11.17; JUDGMENTS § 48.
22. See note 20 supra.
23. Professor James suggests three main patterns for defining "cause of action":
(1) Those which define it in terms of the remedial right which is being enforced and
limit it to a single right ...
(2) Those which define "cause of action" in terms of a single delict or breach of a
primary duty ...(3) Those which give the term "causes of action" a purely factual content ...
JAMES at § 11.10 (footnotes omitted).
It is interesting to note that in view of the above complexity of definitions at least one
court has actually held that it will not enforce the well-stated rule against splitting a single
cause of action "as the evident justice of the particular case requires." State ex rel. White
Pine Sash Co. v. Superior Court for Ferry County, 145 Wash. 576, 579, 261 P. 110, 111
(1927).
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in privity to be bound by the judgment.2 4 Thus, while the general rule is
that "persons who were not made parties and brought before the court
in the first action are not bound by the judgment in it . . .,,21; this rule
is subject to many exceptions. 26
Finally, there are the policy considerations of the doctrine. These
considerations usually emphasize the importance of stability and cer-
tainty in the law so that others can guide their actions accordingly.2
Sometimes, however, this policy, though rigidly applied by the courts,
must give, way to another overriding public policy. 28 For example, in
situations involving special relationships between the parties or a per-
vasive interest of the courts in the subject matter, res judicata will not
be applied.29
[R]es judicata, as the embodiment of a public policy, must, at
times, be weighed against competing interests, and must, on oc-
casion, yield to other policies.30
24. The statement that a person is bound by or has the benefit of a judgment as a
privy is a short method of stating that under the circumstances and for the purpose
of the case at hand he is bound by and entitled to the benefits of all or some of
the rules of res judicata....
JUDGMENTS § 83, comment a.
In most situations where privity has been held to exist, one or more of the following
three relationships are present: "concurrent relationship to the same right of property;
successive relationship to the same right of property; or representation of the interests of
the same person." MOORE at 0.411[1]. See generally JAMES at § 11.24; JUDGMENTS § 79.
25. JAMES at § 11.26. Accord, Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. City of Newport, 247 U.S. 464,
476 (1918) ; Commonwealth v. Brown, 260 F. Supp. 323 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (prior action held
res judicata to commonwealth, attorney general, and city but not to seven minor negroes
denied admission to school for poor white orphans who were not parties to previous action)(vacated on other grounds) ; JUDGMENTS § 93.
26. JAMES at § 11.27-11.30; see note 24 supra.
An interesting recent case dealing with privity for res judicata purposes defined a person
in privity as follows:
[A] person so identified in interest with a party to a former litigation that he
represents precisely the same legal right in respect to the subject matter involved.
Jefferson School of Social Sciences v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 331 F.2d 76, 83
(D.C. Cir. 1963) (footnote omitted).
27. It is important that judgments of the court have stability and certainty . . .so
that the parties and others may rely on them .. .so that the moral force of courtjudgments will not be undermined by an appearance of indecision and vacillation...
the tendency of frequent reversals on appeal to undermine the prestige of and respect
for the trial court.
JAMES at § 11.1 (footnotes omitted). See also JUDGMENTS § 1.
28. JUDGMENTS § 10 lists five factors to be considered in jurisdictional questions.
According to Professor Wright:
The rule that a finding of jurisdiction is res judicata of the issue is subject to
exception when the policy in favor of finality of judgments is outweighed by other
factors.
C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 16 (1963) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT] (footnote omitted).
See generally JAMES at § 11.35; MOORE at f1 0.405 [11]; Comment, Res Judicata: Ex-
clusive Federal Jurisdiction and the Effect of Prior State-Court Determinations, 53 VA. L.
,REV. 1360 (1967) (suggesting the importance of unfettered access to the federal courts as
outweighing the need for finality of judgments in certain cases).
29. Spilker v. Hankin, 188 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
30. Id. at 38-39.
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The courts have produced similar holdings where the underlying policies
of res judicata would be inapplicable to the facts,3 1 would produce an
inequitable result, 2 would be contrary to the intent of Congress,"3 or
would involve habeas corpus. 4
The difficulty in applying these principles to cases involving state
court litigation preceding federal court litigation of the same subject
matter is best illustrated in the case of Angel v. Bullington,33 a much crit-
icized decision. This was a diversity case in which Bullington (plaintiff),
a citizen of Virginia, sued the defendant, a citizen of North Carolina,
for a deficiency judgment and lost in the North Carolina state courts on
the basis of a North Carolina statute precluding recovery. Bullington
did not seek review to the United States Supreme Court. Instead, he
brought the same action in a federal district court in North Carolina,
and on appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that the North
Carolina state judgment operated as res judicata and precluded recovery
in the federal court.3 6 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority,
did qualify his opinion by recognizing that if a federal right had been
claimed, the limitations upon the courts of a state would "not control a
federal court sitting in the state. '37 The basis of the criticism of the
Angel case is centered on the fact that there was never any final judg-
ment on the merits and Bullington never really had his day in court.
8
The most recent case embodying the jurisdiction and res judicata
concepts of the Paul case is Olson v. Board of Education."9 The New York
state courts had upheld the State Commissioner of Education's ruling
on school attendance involving racial imbalance. The Supreme Court
denied certiorari and the plaintiff, a parent of another school child, sought
to enjoin enforcement of the Commissioner's ruling in the federal district
court under the fourteenth amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.40
While the federal court dismissed the complaint, it did rule on the merits
31. Adams v. Pearson, 411 Ill. 431, 104 N.E.2d 267 (1952).
32. State ex rel. White Pine Sash Co. v. Superior Court for Ferry County, 145 Wash.
576, 261 P. 110 (1927).
33. Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940).
34. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
35. 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
36. Id. But see England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, notes 12-15 supra
and note 38 infra.
37. Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 192 (1947). See also WRIGHT at § 46.
38. MOORE at 0.409[2]. Professor Moore argues, in addition, that the claimant should
not have been foreclosed in the federal court for failure to take what seemed to be an un-
necessary appeal from the North Carolina Supreme Court. Id.
The dissent of Mr. Justice Rutledge concerning strong overriding policy decisions and
the uselessness of barring Bullington for not taking an almost hopeless appeal is well worth
reading. Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 201-11 (1947).
See also note 21 supra; notes 28 through 34 supra; MOORE at f1 0.405 [12] (pre-
ferring the England approach to res judicata over that of the Angel case).
39. 250 F. Supp. 1000 (E.D.N.Y. 1966), appeal dismissed, 367 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1966)
(dismissed on other grounds).
40. The plaintiff claimed jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1964) and 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981, 1983 (1964).
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of the case and the approach used is significant. First, under the Congres-
sional statutes invoked by the plaintiff, the court immediately took its
expressed jurisdiction, stating that any failure to state a cause of action
must be decided after the court assumes jurisdiction.41 Additionally, the
court then went on to hold that the case did not fall within the principles
of res judicata or the constitutional requirement of full faith and credit
with respect to extensive previous state litigation42 because the prior
state litigation was not a class action and there was no privity between
the parties of the state and federal action.43 The lack of privity is highly
significant for the purpose of this note because the plaintiff in Olson
was the parent of another child who attended the same school as the
child of the plaintiff in the state court action. This is an exceedingly
close relationship, yet the court refused to find privity for res judicata
purposes.
Accordingly, the state court decision might have great weight under
stare decisis regarding the same issues, but it would have no res judicata
effect in either the state or federal courts.44 The court reasoned that
while the state court litigation had mentioned the constitutional issues, 45
it had never reached them,40 but simply established the powers of the
Commissioner. In conclusion, the court stated that its resolution of the
foregoing issues was not altered by the Supreme Court's denial of
certiorari in the earlier state action inasmuch as the high court had
repeatedly expressed the view that such action is in no way an expres-
sion of opinion upon the merits of any issues involved.'
41. Olson v. Bd. of Educ., 250 F. Supp. 1000, 1004 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
42. Id.
43. Id. This is extremely important in view of the commonality of interest test sug-
gested in Jefferson School of Social Sciences v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., supra
note 26.
44. Olson v. Bd. of Educ., 250 F. Supp. 1000, 1004-005 (E.D.N.Y. 1966). See also note
20 supra.
45. Olson v. Bd. of Educ., 250 F. Supp. 1000, 1005 (E.D.N.Y. 1966). The court cited
with approval the England case (see notes 12-15 supra) and Tribune Review Publishing Co.
v. Thomas, 153 F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Pa. 1957), aff'd, 254 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1958).
The Tribune case involved a proceeding to enjoin enforcement of a state court order
banning photographs at a trial and allowed the litigant to return to the federal court after
unsuccessfully litigating the question in the state courts and having certiorari denied by the
Supreme Court. District Judge Hunter stated:
I conclude, therefore, that refusal of the United States Supreme Court to grant
certiorari to the plaintiffs from the judgment of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
upholding the validity of said County Court Rule in this action, in no way consti-
tutes an adjudication upon the merits and is not res judicata to the issues raised.
Tribune Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas, 153 F. Supp. 486, 492 (W.D. Pa. 1957).
46. See note 21 supra.
47. In Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912 (1950), Mr. Justice
Frankfurter deliberately took the opportunity to explain denial of a petition for writ of
certiorari saying,
Inasmuch, therefore, as all that a denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari
means is that fewer than four members of the Court thought it should be granted,
this Court has rigorously insisted that such a denial carries with it no implication
whatever regarding the Court's views on the merits of a case which it has declined
to review. The Court has said this again and again; again and again the admonition
has to be repeated.
Id. at 919.
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III. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
The instant case was dismissed by the Fifth Circuit on the grounds
of lack of jurisdiction while using the concept of res judicata to allow
the previous state action to bar federal court litigation. Dealing with
the concept of jurisdiction, the court took judicial notice of the prior
state action and concluded that the plaintiffs were requesting appellate
review of the action48 which the federal district courts clearly could not
do according to both the Rooker and Brown cases. 9 Since one of the
plaintiffs, Paul, was making the same argument in the instant case as
he did in the prior state action, the constitutional issues were considered
litigated previously." Although Feder was an additional plaintiff, this
would not confer jurisdiction if it would otherwise be lacking." In relying
on the Brown case, the court dismissed the fact that certiorari had been
denied in the instant case as immaterial. Thus, the court was able to
affirm the dismissal as an attempt by the plaintiffs to have a federal
district court exercise appellate review, which it cannot do, to hear a
federal constitutional question already finally litigated in the state courts.52
Paul v. Dade County appears to hold that one generally cannot ask
a federal district court to review a final state court decision on a federal
constitutional question because it lacks the jurisdiction to do so except
in special circumstances 5 -this is unquestionably the law today. How-
ever, when the fact is taken into account that the court could have
dropped the party creating the res judicata situation, it appears that
what the court is really saying is that one who is a genuine nonparty
and not bound by any concepts of res judicata to a previous final state
court decision on a federal constitutional question cannot enter a federal
48. Paul v. Dade County, 419 F.2d 10, 13 (5th Cir. 1969).
This is particularly interesting in view of the fact that the appellants had argued that
the jurisdiction invoked was the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Con-
stitution as well as 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 (1964) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). Sup-
plemental Brief for Appellant at 5, Paul v. Dade County, 419 F.2d 10 (5th Cir. 1969).
As pointed out in the Olson case and the Tribune case, these statutes alone are sufficient to
invoke the original jurisdiction of the federal district courts whether or not there has been
prior state litigation, see notes 40 and 45 supra.
49. See note 7 supra. But see notes 8-11 supra.
50. See note 5 supra for an examination of the Paul case. As pointed out in that
note, Paul was suing individually. The case was decided partly by determining
whether the Latin cross was a secular symbol and one wonders if the constitutional issue
of establishment of religion was really reached; i.e., was there even a state court decision
on the constitutional merits? Cf. note 21 supra.
51. But note the appellant's argument that Feder was a Jew and a practising attorney
who found the cross offensive as she had to use the courthouse daily, thus raising the free
exercise of religion question. This is clearly a different identifiable interest than that of Paul
(see note 5 supra) and thus raises all the issues of res judicata relating to a nonparty as
discussed previously in notes 24-26 supra, as well as the policy considerations discussed in
notes 27-34 supra when the argument is viewed in the light of the first and fourteenth amend-
ment questions raised.
52. Paul v. Dade County, 419 F.2d 10, 13 (5th Cir. 1969).
53. This is the substance of the Rooker doctrine and the cases which have applied it.
See generally notes 7-11 supra.
1970]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIV
district court to litigate the same legal issue;54 all this is the result of
some fusion of the concepts of jurisdiction and res judicata.
When talking about foreclosing the federal courts to first and four-
teenth amendment issues, or to federal constitutional questions in general,
one must be very careful indeed. The law is probably best expressed in
the England and Olson cases, tempered with strong policy considera-
tions as opposed to the instant case. Since the instant case has few facts
and very little rationale, and therefore subject to a broad interpretation,
it may be applied so as to preclude litigants from using a federal forum,
which for several reasons,55 is better suited than state courts for the
purpose of deciding constitutional questions.
If, as has been suggested above, the justification for original fed-
eral question jurisdiction is to protect litigants relying on federal
law from the danger that state courts will not properly apply that
law, either through misunderstanding or lack of sympathy, then
that jurisdiction should extend to all cases in which the meaning
or application of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States, is a principal element in the position of either party. This
is not now the law. It is the rationale on which the present pro-
posals are based .5
JOEL N. MINSKER
54. This is not the law at present, as a careful examination of this case note will reveal.
However, the instant case seems to suggest this when one considers the reason behind the
court's failure to invoke FED. R. Civ. P. 21 which states:
Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be
dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or of its own
initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against
a party may be severed and proceeded with separately.
The authority for invoking this rule when jurisdictional questions arise is legion. Paul could
have been dropped to preserve federal jurisdiction unless the court is saying it had no juris-
diction with respect to Feder alone-query:
Jurisdictional requirements are of the utmost importance in considering whether
to add or drop parties who are not indispensible . . . . On the other hand, parties
who are not indispensible, may be dropped if necessary in order to preserve federal
jurisdiction.
2 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 543 (Wright ed. 1961) (foot-
notes omitted). See, e.g., Cox v. Hutcheson, 204 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Ind. 1962) (class action
dismissed but individual plaintiff's action continued); Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84
(7th Cir. 1941).
55. To begin, the way in which facts are found often dictates the decision of federal
claims. See notes 15 and 16 supra. Also, federal judges appointed for life are more likely
than elected state judges to enforce the constitutional rights of minorities. England v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 427 (1964). Mr. Justice Douglas
went on to say:
The value of the independence of federal judges, and the value of an escape from
local prejudices when fact findings are made are considerable ones. Yet under the
rule we announce today, those values promise to be lost in important areas of civil
rights.
Id. at 436. Furthermore, federal judges apply a national system of law to protect the national
interest. Wright, The Overloaded Fifth Circuit: A Crisis in Judicial Administration, 42 TEXAS
L. REv. 949 (1964). Finally, federal judges are considered to have an expertise in dealing
with federal questions which exceeds that of state court judges. ALI STuDY OF THE DiVIsION
OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, Tentative Draft No. 6, 72 (1968).
56. Id. at 74.
